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I. INTRODUCTION
Google is no stranger to antitrust law. Scott Cleland has
estimated that the company “officially violated antitrust laws in 10
different ways over 5 years.”1 Commentators routinely critique its
practices as anti-competitive.2 It is under investigation in 9
countries, the EU, and some states in the US.3 But in early January
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law
1. See Scott Cleland, Google’s Global Antitrust Rap Sheet (Jan. 2012),
http://googleopoly.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Googles-Global-Antitrust-RapSheet1.pdf; see also Antitrust Regulators Raid Google’s Offices in South Korea, BBC (Sep.
7, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14816295.
2. Joshua Hazan, Stop Being Evil: A Proposal for Unbiased Google Search, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 789, (2013) (arguing that “Google’s conduct does in fact violate § 2 of the Sherman
Act and § 5 of the FTC Act”); Nathan Newman, The Cost of Lost Privacy: Search, Antitrust,
and the Economics of Control of User Data 1 (on file with authors) (“what is largely missed
in analyses defending Google from antitrust action is how that ever expanding control of
user personal data and its critical value to online advertisers creates an insurmountable
barrier to entry for new competition”); Benjamin Edelman, Bias in Search Results?:
Diagnosis and Response, 7 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 16, 30 (2011) (India).
3. See Cleland, supra note 1; see also Antitrust Commission Probes Allegations of
Antitrust Violations by Google EUROPEAN COMM’N (Nov. 30 2012),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1624_en.htm; Google Faces Texas AG Inquiry,
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2013, Google scored a major victory, as the FTC agreed to drop
nearly all of the most publicized part of its case against the
company: allegations of biased and anticompetitive behavior in
search results. Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch worried that
Google may have been “telling ‘half-truths’ — for example, that
its gathering of information about the characteristics of a consumer
is done solely for the consumer’s benefit, instead of also to
maintain a monopoly or near-monopoly position.”4 But the
majority of the Commission decided unequivocally to end the
investigation. They publicly justified the decision with little more
than a page of assurances that FTC interviews and economic
analyses had found little to no problematic behavior.5
Antitrust complaints against Google crescendoed just as the
company’s market capitalization surpassed that of Microsoft,
another web giant. In the late 1990s, competition authorities in the
US and EU intervened to prevent Microsoft from using its power
over operating systems to funnel PC buyers into the company’s
Internet Explorer web browser, Media Player for music, and Office
for productivity software. The EU, for example, forced a “browser
ballot” onto personal computers using Microsoft’s operating
system.6 Restrictions on Microsoft’s ability to tie browsers, media
players, and other software to its dominant operating system
allowed companies like Google to survive and thrive on the
Internet.

Settles
Privacy
Suit,
REUTERS
(Sept.
3,
2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/03/us-google-settlementidUSN0312083220100903; Italy Launches Antitrust Probe Of Google News, LAW 360
(Aug. 27, 2009) http://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/118735/italy-launches-antitrustprobe-of-google-news.
4. Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Regarding
Google’s Search Practices, In the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163, note 1
(Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchroschstmt.pdf.
5. FTC Closing Letter, STATEMENT OF THE FED. TRADE COMM’N REGARDING GOOGLE’S
SEARCH PRACTICES IN THE MATTER OF GOOGLE INC., FTC File Number 111-0163 (Jan. 3,
2013), http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf. The Commission’s
statement says, “The totality of the evidence indicates that, in the main, Google adopted
[changes] improve the quality of its search results, and that any negative impact on actual or
potential competitors was incidental to that purpose.” But the Commission has not released
details about the nature of that evidence, the types of tests it used, or the standards employed
in them.
6. See generally Andrew Chin, Scholarship: Antitrust Principles in Information
Technology,
available
at
http://www.unclaw.com/chin/scholarship/
index.htm#antitrustinit. When Microsoft failed to add the browser ballot screen to all
versions of windows, the EU fined it €561 million for noncompliance. Jon Brodkin, EU
Fines Microsoft €561 million for not giving users a browser choice, ARS TECHNICA, Mar. 6,
2013, at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/03/eu-fines-microsoft-e561-million-fornot-giving-users-a-browser-choice/.
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Now competition authorities beyond the FTC are considering
whether Google itself is a monopolizer, cutting off upstart,
specialized search engines in order to expand its own internet
empire. Their decisions will shape the future of the digital
marketplace. Without strong action, centrifugal tendencies will
increasingly dominate the internet, as innovation will centralize in
the few mega-firms capable of promoting new services on an everless-level playing field. If antitrust law continues to decline in
power and scope, we should expect a digital replay of the
domination of monopolistic trusts in the late 19th century. As
central to our era’s economy as railroads were to that time’s
economy, these mega-firms are likely to exploit their
infrastructural status for as long as they can convince regulators
and politicians that their market domination is the natural price of
innovation. Thus other competition authorities need to avoid the
FTC’s quiescence. This essay explains (a) what the search bias
case was about, (b) why competition is not “one click away,” (c)
why the FTC’s explanation of its inaction was unsatisfactory, and
(d) how competition agencies will need to treat search bias claims
going forward to avoid the embarrassing denouement of the FTC’s
investigation.
II. A BRIEF GUIDE TO SEARCH BIAS CONCERNS
Imagine that you own Company A, and your main competitor
is the persistent (but demonstrably worse) Company B. In searches
for the products you sell, you reliably end up in the top five results
in the studies you’ve commissioned; your competitors at Company
B are on the fifth or sixth pages. What happens if Google
purchases Company B, and immediately after the purchase,
Company B appears to dominate the first page of results, and your
company has been relegated to later pages? You might start by
appealing to Google employees who run webmaster forums there,
but that (and other mechanisms of corporate due process) are quite
likely to fail. Should there be some type of remedy at law?
As Google acquires more companies, this type of dispute is
becoming increasingly likely. Agencies and courts around the
world have already heard many complaints about anticompetitive
practices at Google. But there are many economists and lawyers
who would dismiss such complaints as parochial disputes, whines
from also-rans unaccustomed to the harsh new realities of online
competition. The etiolated state of American antitrust law makes
that position popular among US elites.
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Despite growing concern about online intermediaries’ power,
legal authorities have done little to regulate these intermediaries
over the past decade. If a search engine is abusing its position,
market-oriented scholars say, economic forces will usually solve
the problem.7 Can’t find something on Google? Hop over to the
Bing search engine. Don’t like the new version of iTunes? Buy a
subscription to a music service.
However well it worked in prior decades, this sanguine attitude
runs into several problems in the digital age.8 How are users to
even know if something is being hidden from them if they are
coming to a firm like Apple or Google to find what they need? As
antitrust authorities investigated it in 2012, Google’s
spokespersons never tired of repeating that “competition is just a
click away;” users had only to type in “Bing” to find another
search engine. The mantra was disingenuous, since it was the
entities that were trying to be found, and not consumers acting as
“finders,” who had initiated the complaints against Google. Small,
web-based companies had to go where the users were—and in
general purpose search, that was largely Google (just as Twitter
dominates microblogging, Facebook general social networking,
and Apple a leading entertainment and app ecosystem).
Nevertheless, scholars have tended to assume that the more
innovation happens on the Internet, the more choices users will
have and the more efficient the market will become. Yet these
scholars have not paid enough attention to the kind of innovation
that is best for society, and whether the uncoordinated preferences
of millions of web users for low-cost convenience are likely to
address the many concerns raised by dominant intermediaries.9
7. See, e.g., Geoffrey Manne & Joshua Wright, Google and the Limits Of Antitrust: The
Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 181 (Winter,
2011) (arguing that these investigations are not based on good antitrust policy). For a
parallel argument in the communications field, see Douglas A. Hass, The Never-WasNeutral Net and Why Informed End Users Can End the Network Neutrality Debates, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565, 1569, 1620–28 (2007) (Describing “the inherent enforcement
difficulties in preemptive or ex post neutrality regulation,” and doubting the utility of
antitrust law). I have tried to demonstrate that both the communications and search
industries need such rules, given their pivotal role in the economy. Frank Pasquale, Internet
Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carriers and Search Engines, 2008
U. CHI. LEG. F. 263, 265 (2008).
8. See BARRY LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE
ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION (2010).
9. A notable exception is Maurice Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 951 (2008) (Noting that “[p]revailing competition advocacy glosses over four
fundamental questions: First, what is competition? Second, what are the goals of a
competition policy? Third, how does one achieve, if one can, the objectives of such desired
competition? Fourth, how does one know if the economy is progressing toward these
goals?”).
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This has left policymakers adrift, and quick to resort to canned
stories about competition and consumer welfare that miss the
stakes of a case like Google’s.

III. REASONS TO DOUBT THAT “COMPETITION IS ONLY A
CLICK AWAY”
Despite persistent controversies surrounding Google, and its
longstanding dominance in the search industry, leading
policymakers have tended to assume that competition will
eventually assuage most critics’ concerns. If consumers wanted a
more open search engine, so the story goes, they would demand it.
When I testified before a Congressional committee in 2008 about
Google's market power, virtually every representative who
questioned me assumed that a clique of twentysomethings working
in a garage could develop an alternative. The representatives didn’t
know much about the Internet, but the press had taught them about
Larry Page and Sergey Brin’s rise from grad students to
billionaires, building a corporate behemoth out of old servers and
ingenuity. In the popular imagination, the Silicon Valley giants’
own rags-to-riches story forever foreshadows their own eventual
displacement by another upstart.10
Is competition actually likely? In his book Planet Google,
Randall Stross suggested that the company was using up to a
million computers to index and map the web.11 If he’s even within
an order of magnitude of the real number (a strictly protected trade
secret), that ought to give pause to anyone who thinks an
alternative can be cooked up in a garage. Indeed, a cursory review
of the growing literature on the power usage of Google belies the
“garage innovator” fantasy: its data centers use the equivalent of
Salt Lake City’s voltage.12 (If your garage can hold about 190,000
people, maybe you can swing that; if it holds 2 cars, you might
need a few more outlets). Companies may be able to lease
computing space at Amazon or other suppliers, but it’s almost
10. See, e.g., John Naughton, Why the Facebook and Apple Empires are Bound to Fail,
THE
Guardian
(Jan.
27,
2013),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology
/2013/jan/27/facebook-apple-only-way-is-down?CMP=twt_gu. Similar arguments have
been made about Google for years. Such authors rarely if ever acknowledge how long
dominance would need to last for them to consider it to be a problem, and the answer is
likely the same as Jack Valenti’s view of the optimal copyright term: forever minus one day.
11. RANDALL STROSS, PLANET GOOGLE: ONE COMPANY’S AUDACIOUS PLAN TO
ORGANIZE EVERYTHING WE KNOW (2007).
12. See James Glanz, Google Details, and Defends, Its Use of Electricity, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/technology/google-details-anddefends-its-use-of-electricity.html.
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impossible to imagine a ragtag crew of grad students, even with a
few million or tens of millions of dollars in venture capital
funding, taking on a large firm like Google. Google is far, far more
likely to purchase a start-up with valuable search technology
(something it tends to do twice a month) than it is to be displaced
by one.13
True, a few other giants might take Google on. Microsoft has
poured money into Bing, but has so far lost billions of dollars—an
unsustainable investment. Governments tried to create an
alternative for a while, but the European Quaero project sputtered
out. Perhaps the engineers involved concluded that the $450
million or so allocated to it could not support a viable rival to a
company with $100 billion in annual revenue. Finally, even if
fellow Goliaths like Facebook, Apple, and Twitter manage to
squeeze Google out of the burgeoning worlds of social media,
mobile computing, and microblogging, they will raise the same
concerns to the extent their domination in those areas matches
Google’s in general purpose search.
Beyond the infrastructural challenge, many other factors make
it extremely difficult for competitors to emerge in the generalpurpose search space. Google’s secrecy is not only designed to
keep spammers from manipulating its results; it can also prevent
rival companies from copying its methods or building upon them.
Unlike patents, which the patent holder must disclose and which
eventually expire, it is possible for trade secrets to never be
revealed, let alone enter the public domain.14
Innovation in search is heavily dependent on a base of users
that “train” algorithms to be more responsive.15 The more search
queries a search engine gets, the better able it is to sharpen and
perfect its results.16 For example, if a search engine finds that
everyone in a given area clicks on the third result instead of the
13. See Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for
Carriers and Search Engines, University of Chicago Legal Forum, 2008 (Describing
Google’s acquisition strategy).
14. Sequential innovation in the private sector relies on later “improvers” being able to
stand on the shoulders of earlier innovators. Trade secrecy threatens to nip that process in
the bud, siloing innovation in search into the firm that came to dominance first.
15. See James Pitkow et. al., Personalized Search, 45 COMMS. ACM, Vol. 45:9 (Sept.
2002) at 51 (discussing methods of personalizing search systems); Elinor Mills, Google
Automates Personalized Search, CNET NEWS, June 28, 2005, http://www.news.com/
Google-automates-personalized-search/2100-1032_3-5766899.html (reporting that Google
launched a new version of its personalized search that monitors previous searches to refine
future results).
16. For example, if 100 people search for “alternatives to Microsoft Word software” on a
search engine on a given day and all pick the third-ranked result, the search algorithm may
adjust itself and put the third-ranked result as the first result the next day. The most-used
search engine will have more data to tweak its algorithms than its less-used rivals.
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first result in a given day, the search engine can tailor results for
that area to elevate what was once merely the third result. If other
firms were able to observe this process, they might be able to
develop rival, and better, computational strategies. Instead, the
data is kept secret.17 The self-reinforcing “Matthew Effect”
described by Robert Merton takes hold: to those who already have
much, more is given.18 Incumbents with large numbers of users
enjoy substantial advantages over entrants.
Competition may not lead to less secretive search engines
unless the important search engine—Google—becomes more open
about its own data and algorithms. It is impossible to find better
interpretations and applications of data without access to it. As
long as Google's search data is secret, no would-be rival will have
access to this critical “raw material” for search innovation.
Google’s Chief Scientist Peter Norvig has made this very point.
"We don't have better algorithms than everyone else,” he has
stated; “we just have more data.”19 Thus Google itself controls the
chief input into better search services: the data that engineers need
in order to better personalize results.20
Restrictive terms of service also deter competitors who aspire
to reverse engineer and develop better versions of such services.21
17. Rival teams might try to run billions of Google searches themselves to reverse
engineer the algorithms, but that would violate the terms of service and would be easily
detected and deterred.
18. Robert K. Merton, The Matthew Effect in Science: The Reward and Communication
Systems of Science are Considered, Science (1968), available at http://www.garfield.
library.upenn.edu/merton/matthew1.pdf (inspired by Matthew 25:29: “For unto every one
that hath shall be given” more).
19. Matt Asay, Tim O’Reilly: ‘Whole Web’ is the OS of the Future, CNET.COM (Mar.
18, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13505_3-10469399-16.html; see also How Google
Plans to Stay Ahead in Search, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 2, 2009),
http://buswk.co/1arA6c (noting Google’s Eric Schmidt’s statement that “Scale is the key.
We just have so much scale in terms of the data we can bring to bear.”).
20. Similar issues were raised by the Google/ITA deal. Randy Stutz, An Examination of
the Antitrust Issues Posed by Google’s Acquisition of ITA, American Antitrust Institute
White
Paper,
at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/GoogleITA%20AAI%20White%20Paper2.18.11.pdf (“acquiring ITA would put Google in the
business of supplying a technology input that powers downstream products in a vertical
online search market. That is, Google would own what many consider to be the premier
technology that online travel agents, travel meta-search websites, and airline websites
license from ITA to afford Internet users the ability to search real-time
pricing and seat availability data in the course of shopping for airline tickets online”). That
is one reason why the DOJ required Google to “license ITA’s software, to continue to
upgrade it and to establish firewalls to hide ITA clients' proprietary information from
Google” for five years. John Simpson and Carmen Balber, DOJ’s Strict Conditions on
Google/ITA Deal Will Open Internet Giant To Unprecedented Scrutiny, CONSUMER
WATCHDOG, at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/doj%E2%80%99s-strictconditions-googleita-deal-will-open-internet-giant-unprecedented-scrutiny.
21. See Google Inc., Terms of Service at § 5.4 (Same policy on Apr. 16, 2007, and July
25, 2011), http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS. Google’s terms of service prohibit any
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Every time a user types in a search query, he is treated by Google
as having agreed to Google’s “Terms of Service.”22 That contract
forbids users to reproduce, copy, or resell any Google service for
any reason, even if the behavior is manual and nondisruptive.23
Another section proscribes “creat[ing] a derivative work of . . . the
Software.”24 Advertisers have faced other restrictions imposed by
Google’s AdWords Terms & Conditions.25 All of these factors
militate against robust competition.
Quantum leaps in technology capable of overcoming these
brute disadvantages are unlikely. Search is as much about
personalized service as it is about technical principles of
information organization and retrieval.26 Current advantage in
search is likely to be self-reinforcing, especially given that so
many more people are using the services now than when Google
overtook other search engines in the early 2000s.27
There are isolated consumer boycotts of Google, but a
company so dominant can do without the business of, say,
hardcore Rick Santorum supporters. Most of the problems
described above would not even be noticed by ordinary web
searchers, let alone provoke a protest. Why would the average user
compare dozens of search results to assess and re-assess rival
companies? Consumers lack both the incentive and the ability to
detect manipulation as long as they are getting “good enough”
action that “interferes with or disrupts” Google’s services, networks, or computers.
Repeated queries to the service necessary to gather data on its operations may well violate
these terms.
22. Id..
23. Id.at § 5.5.
24. Id. at § 10.2. Together, these sections of the TOS explicitly forbid much of the data
harvesting that might be necessary for rival firms to incrementally innovate beyond the
current capacities of Google’s services. Commercial scraping of data, such as the use of
software to automatically gather data from the Google service by a competitor to establish a
rival search engine, is prohibited by multiple sections. Section 5.3 would proscribe both the
automatic data collection and the use of a unapproved “interface” for accessing Google’s
database, regardless of the exact means.
25. See Ben Edelman, Google-Yahoo Ad Deal is Bad for Online Advertising, HARVARD
BUS. S. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Aug.12, 2008), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/cgibin/print/5995.html (arguing that “Google’s restrictions on export and copying of
advertisers’ campaigns . . . hinder competition in Internet advertising”). Though the hearing
at which Professor Edelman was to testify was cancelled, he has documented these
problems in some detail at his website, www.benedelman.org.
26. JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES
OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 8 (2006) (describing how personalized
search enhances the value of search engines to both users and advertisers). Due to trade
secrecy, it is impossible for policymakers to discover how much of an intermediary’s
success is due to its employees’ inventive genius, and how much is due to the collective
contributions of millions of users to the training of the intermediary’s computers.
27. See RANDALL STROSS, PLANET GOOGLE: ONE COMPANY’S AUDACIOUS PLAN TO
ORGANIZE EVERYTHING WE KNOW (2007) (describing the success of YouTube, a
subsidiary of Google).
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results. Given the opacity of search algorithms, neither users nor
trusted proxies can reverse engineer the hundreds of factors that go
into a ranking.28
Rather than “Competition is one click away” (the mantra of
Google's antitrust lawyers), a more honest shibboleth would be
“worse alternatives are one click away” (the view expressed
privately to the investors who have driven up Google’s stock price
over the years). Google use is more like co-investment than a oneoff purchase. The more you use it, the more it can tailor its
offerings to you. As Marcelo Thompson observes, “it is clear that
a situation of lock-in has arisen in relation to Google's dominant
position in the information environment.”29 And just as individuals
“teach” the artificially intelligent algorithms what each of them
wants, Google’s access to the aggregate data on search behavior
helps fill in gaps where past surveillance of individuals provides
no guides.

IV. THE ANTITRUST TRAP
In the U.S., mere possession of dominant market share—or
even a monopoly—is not enough to lead to antitrust liability.
Complainants must show evidence of genuine restraint of trade, a
set of practices rendered more difficult to prove over the decades
by courts increasingly influenced by the Chicago School of
economics. Though American antitrust laws (including the
Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts) were rooted in a political vision
of fragmenting business power to avoid corporate capture of the
legislative process, courts gradually tired of trying to bring order to
precedents based on highly contextualized assessments of
corporate conduct.30 They chose, instead, to gradually adopt a
highly technical set of definitions of anti-competitive conduct.
28. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the
Right to Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179, 185 (2001) (discussing the difficulty
of replicating a search engine’s work).
29. Marcelo Thompson, In Search of Alterity: On Google, Neutrality, and Otherness, 14
TULANE J. TECH. & INT. PROP. 137, 165 (2011) (describing the “click away delusion”).
30. See Maurice Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 951 (2008)
Noting that:
[a]lthough neoclassical economic theory may be indifferent to
[many] distributional effects, one concern underlying the Sherman
Act’s passage in 1890 was the growing disparity in wealth . . . .
Senator Sherman identified this inequality of condition, of wealth,
and opportunity as the greatest threat to disturbing social order: This
inequality has grown within a single generation out of the
concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production
and trade and to break down competition.

10
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Behind the technique, though, lay a seminal work by Robert Bork,
The Antitrust Paradox.31
Bork’s thesis was relatively simple. Antitrust lawyers tended
to defend their interventions in markets by saying that monopolies
(and large firms exercising market power) were inefficient. Only
competition would lead firms to innovate, reduce prices and
improve quality. But for Bork, this forward-looking explanation
for progressive antitrust policy missed the backward-looking
evidence of exceptional innovation—that is, market dominance.
We should expect the truly exceptional firm to attract a mass of
consumers. Market dominance could just as easily be evidence of a
firms’ productivity as its power. Thus Bork called antitrust law a
“policy at war with itself:” in the name of promoting competition,
the law could take off the table the greatest reward for competing
well—market dominance.
As Bork’s (and the Chicago School’s) ideas took hold, U.S.
antitrust law became encrusted with an apparatus methods
designed to spot those instances when a firm has won its dominant
position in a market by clearly illegitimate means. Monopolies are
fine, so long as they are not the result (or cause) of
“monopolization.” An ever-narrowing set of actions and effects,
not a firm’s dominant status, are the key triggers for monitoring
and potential penalties.
A post hoc, episodic antitrust enforcement model could
work in a relatively simple business world, where written business
records could be subject to definitive econometric analyses. But
what happens in digital businesses driven by complex algorithms,
where intent and effect can be hidden in millions of lines of
computer code subject to multiple interpretations and almost
entirely hidden from view. Even in environments conducive to
investigation, one person’s anti-competitive conduct can often be
31. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). Bork argued antitrust law
should narrowly focus on “consumer welfare,” price-fixing, and little else. Bork’s book has
been cited in over 150 antitrust cases. Bork’s followers largely ignore the ways powerful
firms can leverage long-term dominance by using profits gained from one monopoly to
undercut competitors in adjacent fields. They have steadily undermined a more expansive
vision of how antitrust can benefit society by ensuring competition and enabling small,
emerging companies to thrive, compete, and innovate. If a business practice appears to help
individual consumers, however trivially, there’s little concern about its long term effects;
see also Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, What Does The Chicago School Teach About
Internet Search And The Antitrust Treatment Of Google?, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE,
http://aei.org/files/2012/10/05/-what-does-the-chicago-school-teach-aboutinternet-search-and-the-antitrust-treatment-of-google_132249480630.pdf (blessing Google’s
near-monopoly over search advertising as “pro-competitive” in one of Bork’s last writings,
an October 2012 white paper commissioned by Google). But see Scott Cleland, BorkSidak’s Fatally Flawed Google Antitrust Defense, THE PRECURSOR BLOG (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://www.precursorblog.com/node/1737.
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characterized as another’s effective business strategy—thus the
enormous time and expense devoted to many modern antitrust
suits. Antitrust cases tend to consume a great deal of resources, in
part because economic conduct is subject to many different
interpretations.32 When “new economy” firms enter the mix,
regulators are liable to throw up their hands in frustration,
unwilling to even try to give a reliable, public estimate of the
harms and benefits arising out of any particular transaction or
practice.

V. KICKING THE TIRES IS NOT LOOKING UNDER THE HOOD
This appears to have happened during the FTC’s investigation
into anti-competitive search bias at Google. Despite having an over
100-page memo prepared by staff describing the bases of a case
against Google in 2012, the Commission stalled action repeatedly
and barely stirred itself to hire the requisite technical experts to
understand the bases of complaints against the company that
year.33 It finally closed the investigation, in a document that spent
barely 2 pages discussing search bias allegations.34
The FTC did “not find Google’s business practices with
respect to the claimed search bias to be, on balance, demonstrably
anti-competitive.” But the decision was almost immediately
second guessed, because the agency failed to articulate exactly
why it believed search bias would be illegal under current antitrust
law, how one would test for it, and whether those who believed
they were affected by it would be able to challenge the agency’s
32. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Un-Microsoft Un-Remedy: Law Can Prevent the Problem
that It Can’t Patch Later, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1361, 1361–62 (1999).
The main concern in finding a remedy for [‘bad monopolist
behaviors’] may be time: The technology environment moves at a
lightning pace, and by the time a federal case has been made out of a
problem, the problem is proven, a remedy fashioned, and appeals
exhausted, the damage may already be irreversible.
33. See Steve Lohr, Drafting Antitrust Case, F.T.C. Raises Pressure on Google, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/technology/ftc-staff-preparesantitrust-case-against-google-over-search.html (reporting that the FTC staff had prepared a
secret 100-page memo advocating legal action against Google). The sudden reversal in
January, 2013, raised many questions. Did the staff change its mind completely in less than
90 days? Were they been overruled by political appointees? See Peter Maass, Your FTC
Privacy Watchdogs: Low-Tech, Defensive, Toothless, WIRED (June 28 2012),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/06/ftc-fail/all/ (noting, in the privacy context, that
“[t]he agency can take companies to court, but its overworked lawyers don’t really have the
time to go the distance against the bottomless legal staffs in Silicon Valley.” Is the same
now true for competition law as well?
34. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In
the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163, January 3, 2013,
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf.
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interpretations of its analyses of data provided by Google.35 In
response to allegations of search bias, Google’s public assurances
have amounted to little more than a message of, “Trust us.” And at
the end of its investigation into the potential bias, the FTC
essentially said “We do.”36
Journalists and watchdog groups were disappointed in the
conclusion of the FTC’s investigation as well.. As a New York
Times reporter put it, “the FTC did not detail how it defined harm
or what quantitative measures it had used to determine that Google
users were better off.”37 Nor did the agency appear to consider
whether small consumer gains now from, say, an ultra-clean
interface of purely Google-owned or -affiliated results might later
disserve consumers who want more diverse offerings. In response
to this opacity, one public interest group has already put in a FOIA
request for communications between Google and the FTC.
Consumer Watchdog has requested public disclosure of a staff
report that was reported to have recommended more robust
action.38
The Director of the Bureau of Economics at the FTC
responded to these concerns, assuring the New York Times that,
“We kick the tires hard on all of the data we receive.” But the 4
page findings of the Commission don’t even give us a sense of the
hypotheses the FTC tested, or even the full legal theory of the case.
If one of my students came to me at the end of a seminar with a
four page report elaborating on the idea that “there really wasn’t
much of a problem” in the area he had investigated, he would get a
failing grade. Certainly a federal agency with staff, concluding a
20-month investigation, can do better than this.
The Director’s comment is unintentionally revealing, however.
In my past work on consumer protection and competition
regulation, I have insisted that agencies be able to “look under the
hood” of highly advanced technologies like the algorithms at the
heart of the Google search engine.39 This might involve hiring
35. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In
the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf
36. Frank Pasquale, Google Antitrust: The FTC Folds, MADISONIAN (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://madisonian.net/2013/01/03/google-antitrust-the-ftc-folds/
37. See Edward Wyatt, Critics of Google Antitrust Ruling Fault the Focus, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/technology/googles-rivals-say-ftcantitrust-ruling-missed-the-point.html
38. See Stephen Shankland, Watchdog Seeks FTC Staff Opinion on Google Antitrust
Case, CNET.COM (Jan. 8, 2013), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-5756284193/watchdog-seeks-ftc-staff-opinion-on-google-antitrust-case/
39. See Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105.

Paradoxes of Digital Antitrust

13

computer scientists, programmers, and other experts capable of
understanding exactly how algorithms changed over time, and how
directives from top management might influence what is always
portrayed as a scientific, technical, and neutral process.40 “Kicking
the tires” is not a metaphor suggestive of expert analysis. Rather, it
suggests a skeptical consumer trying, as best he can, to use
whatever signals are available to a layman to make an assessment
ultimately beyond his competence. Until the FTC releases more
information on how it assesses accusations like search bias, we
may need to consider its investigative capacity little better than
that of the consumers it ostensibly protects.
Fortunately, there are some signs of hope at the agency, at
least among privacy regulators. Realizing how quickly the world
of online data collection is moving, the FTC has taken important
steps to monitor evolving business practices. The agency
appointed “Chief Technologists” and has also employed highly
regarded privacy experts with expertise in computer science. Each
has done a great deal to help the agency apply expertise to current
problems in privacy. Moreover, the agency’s report, Protecting
Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations
For Businesses and Policymakers, was a model of sensitive
appreciation of stakeholder concerns, leading to guidance on some
best practices for digital companies.
This perceptive, well-written report grappled with
fundamental issues in the law of fair data practices and consumer
protection. Where the law was plainly inadequate, the report said
so. For example, it supported "legislation that would provide
consumers with access to information held by data brokers," an
increasingly important priority in a pervasively scored society.41
The FTC’s December 2012 subpoena of leading data brokers
indicates an interest in illuminating some of the darker corners of
data collection, analysis, sharing, and use. The FTC’s commitment
to technical personnel and cutting edge reports is something of a
model for other agencies tasked with protecting privacy in an era
of rapid change. We can hope that the Bureau of Competition will
learn from the example of its colleagues in privacy regulation.

40. Elizabeth Van Couvering, Is Relevance Relevant? Market, Science, and War:
Discourses of Search Engine Quality, JCMC , Vol. 12, No. 3 (2007) at 866–87.
41. Applying the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the FTC itself required firms that “score” the
health status of individuals based on their pharmacy records to disclose these records to
scored individuals.
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VI. THE HOPE AT THE BOTTOM OF PANDORA’S BOX
To be sure, Google hired some of the best minds in the legal
profession (and academy) to promote its position.42 That kind of
advocacy often gets results. But until we have a better sense of the
answers to the questions above, the bottom line is that a black box
investigation exonerated a black box search engine—cold comfort
for those who might worry about the power exercised by Google
online.
Fortunately, in the terms of Google’s own “commitment letter”
to the FTC, Google states that it won’t demote sites in general
purpose search results (on Google.com) if the sites opt out of
having their content scraped onto Google Shopping, G+ Local,
Flights, Hotels, and Advisor pages. As the FTC Chairman put it,
“Going forward, Google will allow websites the ability to opt out
of appearing in its vertical properties like Google Local or Product
Shopping, without being penalized or demoted in its general search
results on Google.com.”43 But what happens if a site produces
evidence that it has been demoted after opt-out (during the 5-year
period this commitment letter is good for)? Is there any FTC
process that will be faster, more accurate, or more streamlined
than, say, a good old-fashioned adjudication?
If the FTC’s Google search bias investigation is not to have
been a total waste, we will need to see positive answers to these
questions. To assure a better competitive landscape online,
promote privacy, and get a handle on the quasi-governmental role
of large internet companies, we need a much better sense of how
these companies are actually conducting their business and using
data.
To conclusively adjudicate cases like these, a panel
advising the FTC would need extensive access to the relevant
Google search algorithms to assess the company's treatment of
42. See Eric Goldman, The FTC Smartly Ends Its Imprudent Google Search Antitrust
Investigation, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman
/2013/01/03/the-ftc-smartly-ends-its-imprudent-google-search-antitrust-investigation/.
Google spent millions of dollars trying to sway the FTC. Google’s
economic stimulus package included a dozen DC lobbying firms . . .
big brand-name paid influencers such as Robert Bork (recently
deceased), Eugene Volokh, Marvin Ammori and many others, and
multiple conferences designed to educate DC insiders. Not directly
tied to this investigation, Google also has invested substantially in its
policy and advocacy work in other ways, as we discovered in Oracle
v. Google and we’ve seen from its work in Germany.
43. Google Press Conference, Opening Remarks of Federal Trade Commission Chairman
Jon Leibowitz As Prepared for Delivery (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
leibowitz/130103googleleibowitzremarks.pdf.
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upstart vertical search services.44 Google keeps close tabs on its
users’ every click; surely it is not too much to ask the company
itself to document all the changes to its algorithms (and especially
manual interventions by human beings) so that someone—such as
a regulatory agency, a nonprofit organization, a judge, or a
standard-setting body—can look under the hood and understand
what is going on. After the Microsoft antitrust case, the parties to
the litigation agreed to appoint a Technical Committee to be
empowered to understand how decisions at that critical computing
company originated and how they were implemented. A similar
body should be appointed for Google, and quite possibly for
Facebook, Apple, Amazon, and Twitter as well.
Reporting to a Technical Committee may seem like a
major burden for a technology company.45 However, changes in
ranking methodology at such firms are rigorously tested and
documented.46 When a website suddenly tumbles dozens of places
in search results, and has a plausible story about being targeted as a
potential rival of an established Google interest or in a space the
company is planning to invest in, is it too much to ask for some
third party to review the particular factors that led to the demotion?
Given how quickly a sudden drop usually occurs, we are not
discussing an infinite variety of changes to be reviewed. Nor
would such review require the disclosure of the entire algorithm to
a third-party auditor, or even the revelation of the relevant changes
in the algorithm to the party involved, much less the general
public.47 In my early work on this topic, my coauthor and I even
44. The question is whether the change was driven entirely by its purported account of a
multistep, user-test-driven process of assessing the quality of search results, or whether
motives of self-preservation and competition strangulation informed the ostensibly neutral
ranking algorithms.
45. Managers of the Ammori Group, a law firm and Internet-law consulting practice
whose client include Google, have made this argument. Marvin Ammori and Luke Pelican,
Competitors’ Proposed Remedies for Search Bias, 15(11) J. INTERNET L. 1, 16, 26 (2012)
(“Microsoft's top lawyer for antitrust issues noted that the technical committee's staff
ballooned from three people to 40 and that the majority of Microsoft's compliance efforts
required laborious and time-consuming back-and-forth with that committee.”); Erick
Schonfeld, “Google and Monopoly Theater,” TechCrunch, Sept. 25, 2011 (“Senator Al
Franken suggested the possibility of a voluntary technical committee to provide oversight,
to which Google's outside lawyer Susan Creighton responded (quite correctly): ‘Google
already changes its algorithm 500 times a year. I think a technical committee would be too
slow to keep up with changes in the market.’”).
46. See e.g., Search Quality Highlights: 52 Changes for April, INSIDE SEARCH: THE
OFFICIAL GOOGLE SEARCH BLOG (May 4, 2012, 1:44 PM), http://insidesearch.
blogspot.com/2012/05/search-quality-highlights-53-changes.html (last updated May 6,
2012).
47. Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 Clev. St. L. Rev.
115, 125 (2006) (discussing the need to balance the trade secrecy interests of search engines
against regulators’ prerogatives to understand the basis of some ranking decisions).
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pointed to the precedent of the secretive Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) court as a model, to underscore how much
we respected the intellectual property rights of the company whose
actions are being reviewed (and particularly the value of trade
secrecy).48
As antitrust expert Mark Patterson has shown, the Dodd-Frank
Act already requires far more disclosure from rating agencies than
was previously required.49 Patterson believes that such legislation
is a model for intervention here, because “Google has been alleged
to have manipulated its search results (or ratings) in much the same
way that the rating agencies have been alleged to have manipulated
credit ratings.”50 In the Dodd-Frank Act, Patterson documents,
“Congress directed the SEC to prescribe rules that, when creditrating agencies make ‘material changes’ to ‘rating procedures and
methodologies,’ ensure that: ‘the changes are applied consistently
to all credit ratings to which the changed procedures and
methodologies apply . . . and [the CRA] publicly discloses the
reason for the change.’”51 Such requirements do not impinge on

48. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness,
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008).
49. Mark Patterson, Manipulation of Product Ratings: Credit-Rating Agencies, Google,
and Antitrust, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Apr. 17, 2012, https://www.
competitionpolicyinternational.com/manipulation-of-product-ratings-credit-rating-agenciesgoogle-and-antitrust/, noting that:
Although Google is alleged to have manipulated the ratings of
competitors (e.g., potentially competing “vertical” search engines)
and credit rating agencies are alleged to have manipulated the ratings
of customers (issuers of financial products), the basic phenomenon is
the same . . . . lack of transparency in quality can give an information
provider market power, as does an absence of price transparency.
50. Id. Evgeny Morozov and Julie Cohen have also advocated for more independent
review of tech companies’ algorithms. MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE:
THE FOLLY OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM (2013) (finding international examples to
buttress Patterson’s and Carroll’s comparison between financial and tech regulation, based
on Hong Kong’s regulation of algorithmic trading); COHEN, CONFIGURING THE
NETWORKED SELF 8 (2011) (“The lives of situated subjects are increasingly shaped by
decisions made and implemented using networked information technologies. Those
decisions present some possibilities and foreclose others. Most people have very little
understanding of the ways that such decisions are made or of the options that are not
presented. In many cases, this facial inaccessibility is reinforced by regimes of secrecy that
limit even technically trained outsiders to “black box” testing. We would not tolerate
comparable restrictions on access to the basic laws of physics, chemistry, or biology, which
govern the operation of the physical environment. The algorithms and protocols that sort
and categorize situated subjects, shape information flows, and authorize or deny access to
network resources are the basic operational laws of the emerging networked information
society; to exercise meaningful control over their surroundings, people need access to a
baseline level of information about what those algorithms and protocols do.”).
51. Id.
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the information providers’ judgments; they simply require that
some information about it be given.52
In contexts ranging from privacy rights to false advertising,
authorities in the US and Europe have recognized the need for fast,
flexible “quick looks” at suspect business practices.53 In the case of
FTC investigations into false advertising, 95% of problematic
situations are quickly resolved in a self-regulatory fashion, by
nongovernmental entities. This is not a recipe for the litigation
nightmares industry advocates so frequently invoke. Rather, it is a
matter of establishing some entity outside of Google (and other
very large internet companies), whether as a result of competition
law, consumer protection law, or other principles of commercial
fairness, that has authority to review and offer its judgment on
such questions.
What that entity ultimately does about its findings is not my
central concern at this time. Simply informing consumers about
potential biases would be a valuable public service. Indeed, Google
itself often deflects complaints about its services by arguing that
consumer education is the solution. If Google is serious about
valuing openness, it should welcome such scrutiny.

VII. REGULATION’S RATIONALE: THE GROWING PREVALENCE
OF CREDENCE SERVICES AND MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS IN A
COMPLEX ECONOMY
There are two critical rationales for holding search engines to
higher standards than ordinary internet companies. First, they
operate not only as simple sellers of services, but as multisided
platforms, bringing together advertisers, consumers, and all
manner of other cultural and political entities. That status, as
intermediaries that users must use and trust for reliability, flags the
history of regulation of communications networks as a potential
model for search regulation.
Second, search is, in many circumstances, a “credence
service.” To understand its uniqueness, compare it with other
52. Andrew Carroll, Don’t Be Evil. . . Unless it Increases Revenue: What the Operation
of Credit Rating Agencies Can Teach Us About Google, 31 TEMP. J. SCI., TECH., & ENV. L
93, 117 (“The similarities between the problems existing within both CRAs and
Google make Dodd-Frank a good starting point for regulating Google. Requiring an internal
documentation process as well as yearly reviews by a regulatory agency could also be
applied to Google's ranking process. By implementing such oversight, the government
would be able to ensure that the objectivity proclaimed by Google is actually being
instituted without the risk of outside manipulation that is created by public disclosure.”).
53. See Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. Rev. 105 (2010).
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services. Consumers can immediately assess the value of ordinary
goods and services: a car is either cleaned or it is not; a drinking
glass either holds liquids or fails to. Government agencies also
help to keep other quality concerns out of mind. Most of the time,
we don’t need to independently test our food for E. coli, or reweigh a box of cereal to assure it really contains 10 ounces of bran
flakes. We can assume the Food and Drug Administration, and a
state board of weights of and measures, have sufficiently vetted
quality. Experience goods and services are a bit more of a
challenge to find and evaluate: only after consumption can you
really say whether, say, a given song is worth purchasing, or a
restaurant has lived up to its reputation.54
Credence goods and services are more perplexing: it is often
difficult to assess their quality accurately even after they have been
purchased and used. When a non-lawyer seeks legal advice about a
complex situation, it’s very hard for him or her to know if he has
been well served. Similarly, a patient may need to seek a second
opinion about a doctor’s diagnosis. In these scenarios, the
consumer himself may not even be able to assess the quality of the
service after experiencing it; only time (or an expert) will reveal
the level of quality. Thus the “credence” nomenclature: the
ordinary consumer must trust the provider more than an ordinary
vendor, because it’s expensive (and sometimes impossible) to
know if the provider has actually given her best efforts (let alone
provided appropriate advice or care).55
Search is also often a credence service: you would probably
not be using a search engine if you already knew what you wanted.
And rare is the person who takes the time to compare results at one
search engine with those at another. Moreover, given the
importance of personalization to many good search results, it’s
hard to imagine how this could even be done: the service provided
by the search engine with more data about your prior searching
habits may be entirely different than one working from a blank
slate.
Is it too much to ask for some entity outside of Google to be
able to “look under the hood” and understand what is going on in
54. See Philip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78(2) Journal of Political
Economy 311–29
(1970),
available
at
http://193.146.160.29/gtb/sod/usu/
$UBUG/repositorio/10290324_Nelson.pdf.
55. Both the legal and medical professions are heavily regulated in part in order to protect
consumers against information asymmetries they can’t easily redress. Both doctors and
lawyers must pass exams to demonstrate that they actually know what they are doing,
engage in continuing education to keep their skills sharp, and often buy malpractice
insurance in order to be sure that victims of their mistakes enjoy some kind of
compensation. Conflicts of interests must be minimized and disclosed when they arise.
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plausibly contested scenarios? If so, such an abdication of
administrative responsibility in the face of technical complexity
bodes ill not merely for a level competitive playing field, but for
democratic and judicial processes themselves in an era of
technological advance.56 The FTC flirts with irrelevance if it
disdains the technical tools necessary to understand a modern
information economy.

VIII. AGAINST DIGITAL FEUDALISM
Is there any natural limit to the aspirations of a large internet
company like Google? As Siva Vaidhyanathan noted in his
thoughtful 2010 book The Googlization of Everything, Google’s
stated goal is to “organize the world’s information.” As more
economic value is concentrated in virtual products and automation,
this aspiration becomes all the more striking. Organizing global
information flows and archives is a few short steps from
organizing global economic activity itself. That aspiration is the
natural extension of Wall Street demands for constant corporate
growth. Tech giants are already huge—in mid-2012, Apple alone
contributed to 20% of the gains of the S&P 500, and Facebook’s
initial market valuation was based on assumptions that it would
gain 10% of all global advertising budgets by 2020. Eyeing these
figures, Google’s own push for constant growth is a bit more
understandable.
If antitrust law continues to decline in power and scope, we
should expect a digital replay of the domination of monopolistic
trusts in the late nineteenth century. As central to our era’s
economy as railroads were to that time, these companies are likely
to exploit their infrastructural status for as long as they can
convince regulators and politicians that their market domination is
the natural price of innovation.
For anyone wowed by a free service like Gmail, Google’s
expansionary moves might seem a welcome intervention. Many
fields need a dose of data-driven results and user-friendly design.
Nevertheless, regulators should be concerned about Google using
its dominance in general purpose search to leverage undue power
in other, more specialized fields. We either commit to a 21st
century antitrust law capable of detecting and deterring misuses of
56. Several authors have commented on the fading relevance of law (and, by implication,
democracy) when technological imperatives are assumed to trump public values. See, e.g.,
DANILO ZOLO, DEMOCRACY AND COMPLEXITY: A REALIST APPROACH (1992); WILLIAM E.
SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME (2004).
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power online, or we allow centralizing tendencies to concentrate
innovation in the few mega-firms capable of gathering critical data
and promoting new services on an ever-less-level playing field.

